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LET’S ALL AGREE TO DISAGREE, AND 
MOVE ON: ANALYZING SLAUGHTER-HOUSE 
AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT’S 
PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 
UNDER “SUNK COST” PRINCIPLES 
Abstract: The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment has lain nearly dormant since the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1872 deci-
sion in the Slaughter-House Cases. Although legal historians have fought to 
overturn Slaughter-House for decades to restore the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause to its intended preeminence in American jurisprudence, these 
historians cannot agree on the correct meaning and scope of the clause. 
Each historical interpretation of the clause would affect the scope and 
power of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the modern era; however, 
American jurisprudence has already found the clause’s intended powers 
in alternative constitutional provisions post-Slaughter-House. Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court’s likely reliance on “sunk cost” principles to justify its 
modern refusal to revive the clause is the most rational resolution to this 
long-debated issue of American Constitutional law. 
Introduction 
 The American Civil War remains the largest source of bloodshed 
this country has ever suffered.1 The country, divided on the fundamen-
tal questions of who was a citizen and what rights he deserved, lost 
nearly 620,000 lives searching for these answers.2 The result of the war 
was the adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, collectively incorporating the 
African-American race into citizenship, and the males of that citizenry 
into enfranchisement.3 Despite the broad successes that these amend-
ments have achieved in the centuries following their adoption, histori-
                                                                                                                      
1 Civil War Facts, Civil War Trust, www.civilwar.org/education/history/faq (last vis-
ited Aug. 5, 2013). 
2 See id. This author notes that the use of the gendered term “he” is used intentionally 
as a reflection of attitudes in the nineteenth century. 
3 U.S. Const. amend. XV, § 1(“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall 
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, 
or previous condition of servitude.”); id. amend. XIV; id. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slav-
ery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States . . . .”). 
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ans still lament over the Fourteenth Amendment, dreaming of what 
could have been.4 
 The first section of the Fourteenth Amendment contains the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.5 Although few clauses in the Constitution have received 
as much attention as the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause has lain nearly dormant since the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases (“Slaughter-House”) in 
1872.6 
 Legal historians have fought to overturn Slaughter-House for dec-
ades and have urged the Supreme Court to return the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause to its intended preeminence in American jurispru-
dence.7 Because of their persistent efforts to overturn Slaughter-House, 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia aptly named this fight “the dar-
ling of the professoriate.”8 Although most legal historians can agree 
that Slaughter-House wrongly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, these scholars cannot agree on exactly what its drafters in-
tended for its meaning and scope.9 For this reason, the debate has be-
come largely history-based, and has focused on the Antebellum and 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id. amend. XIV, § 1; infra notes 19–84 and accompanying text (describing the le-
gal historians’ debate over the proper interpretations of the intended scope of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause); infra notes 169–174 and accompanying text (describing the 
broad successes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). The debate over 
the Fourteenth Amendment that this Note considers involves primarily the amendment’s 
first section, which states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
5 Id. 
6 See Butchers’ Benevolent Assoc. of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing 
& Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–80 (1872) [hereinafter Slaughter-House]. 
Compare infra notes 85–148 and accompanying text (illustrating the few Supreme Court 
cases that have addressed the Privileges or Immunities Clause and the narrow interpreta-
tion given to the clause), with infra notes 169–174 and accompanying text (describing the 
preeminence of Due Process case law in the modern era). 
7 See infra notes 19–84 and accompanying text (discussing three alternative interpreta-
tions of the Privileges or Immunities Clause based on legal historians’ different historical 
retellings of the Antebellum and Reconstruction Eras). 
8 Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 
(2010) (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter McDonald Transcript]. 
9 See infra notes 19–84 and accompanying text. 
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Reconstruction Eras to determine what rights and protections the 
drafters of the Privileges or Immunities Clause intended to provide.10 
Despite the valiant efforts of historians, it seems that the true intention 
of the drafters of the Privileges or Immunities Clause may never be real-
ized.11 Nevertheless, following the narrowing of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause to the point of near-eradication in Slaughter-House, the 
judiciary has relied on alternative legal provisions to source and secure 
Americans’ substantive rights.12 
 This Note argues that the Supreme Court likely views the 140 years 
of Slaughter-House precedent under “sunk cost” principles and is unlike-
ly to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause to any preeminent 
source of power.13 Additionally, where the majority of what the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause would have achieved in the nineteenth cen-
tury has been achieved through alternative means in the centuries 
since, legal historians should begin to recognize and embrace the Su-
preme Court’s ad hoc handling of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
as the most rational approach to this storied clause.14 
 Part I of this Note details the disagreements among the three pop-
ular historical interpretations of the pre-ratification years and describes 
what each historical retelling holds in terms of the meaning of the Priv-
ileges or Immunities Clause.15 Part II details the judicial interpretations 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.16 Part III analyzes how each his-
torical approach would affect the scope and power of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and, further, how American jurisprudence has 
found these powers in alternative avenues post-Slaughter-House.17 Lastly, 
Part IV argues that interpreting the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
                                                                                                                      
10 See infra notes 19–84 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 226–228 and accompanying text (arguing that the Supreme Court 
views the Privileges or Immunities Clause under “sunk cost” principles because the Court 
recognizes that the true intentions of the clause’s drafters may never be ascertained). 
12 See infra notes 149–213 and accompanying text (describing the ways in which the 
purposes of the Privileges or Immunities Clause have been achieved through the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the selective incorporation process, and a gradual change in the balance of 
power between the states and the federal government). For example, the Supreme Court 
has relied heavily on the Due Process Clause as a source of substantive rights in the years 
since Slaughter-House. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (recognizing a 
woman’s right to determine whether to have an abortion as a fundamental right protected 
by the Due Process Clause); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (recog-
nizing marital privacy as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause). 
13 See infra notes 214–228 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 229–254 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 19–84 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 85–148 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 149–213 and accompanying text. 
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under sunk cost principles, as the Supreme Court has, proves that the 
modern refusal to revive the clause is the most rational resolution to 
this long-debated area of American Constitutional law.18 
I. The Historical Debate Rages on 
 Legal historians have long attempted to articulate exactly what the 
drafters intended when writing, and later ratifying, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause in 1868.19 But, as Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas said, “Legal scholars agree on little beyond the conclusion that 
the Clause does not mean what the Court said it meant in 1873 [sic] [in 
Slaughter-House].”20 Recognizing the historical backdrop to the drafting 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is a necessary prerequisite to 
understanding the disappointment that was Slaughter-House.21 More-
over, only by placing the Privileges or Immunities Clause into its proper 
historical context can one identify the appropriate scope and meaning 
of the clause in our jurisprudence post-Slaughter-House.22 
                                                                                                                     
 Section A discusses one historical retelling of the pre-ratification 
years, focusing primarily on the Comity Clause and its effect on the 
drafters’ and adopters’ interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause.23 Section B discusses another historical retelling of the pre-
ratification years, focusing primarily on the actual ratification debates 
and their impact on the drafters’ and adopters’ interpretation of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause.24 Finally, Section C discusses a third 
historical retelling of the pre-ratification years, focusing on the preva-
lence of federalism as a theme in the Reconstruction Era, and its effect 
on the drafters’ and adopters’ interpretation of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause.25 
 
18 See infra notes 214–254 and accompanying text. 
19 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; infra notes 26–84 and accompanying text. 
20 Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 522 n.1 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
21 See id. at 528 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “[b]efore invoking the [Privileges 
or Immunities Clause], however, we should endeavor to understand what the Framers of 
the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant”); see also Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 
Wall.) at 78–80. 
22 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 522 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
23 See infra notes 26–48 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. 
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A. Focus on the Antebellum Era: The Comity Clause 
 The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment states that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”26 
It bears substantial likeness to the Comity Clause of Article IV, Section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution, which states that “[t]he Citizens of each State 
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the sev-
eral States.”27 Given both the similarities between the two clauses and 
the prevalence of Comity Clause issues involving slaves in the Antebel-
lum Period, many legal historians believe that the drafters intended the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause to guarantee long-recognized Comity 
Clause protections to a new class of citizens: newly freed slaves.28 
 The Comity Clause had a long and storied history in the Antebel-
lum Period.29 A version of the Comity Clause was incorporated in Arti-
cle IV of the Articles of Confederation and was seamlessly placed into 
the Constitution in 1787.30 Such clauses were common in other coun-
tries and were largely intended to ensure that a citizen traveling to an-
other jurisdiction would be afforded the same local rights as the citi-
zens of that jurisdiction.31 The relatively benign Comity Clause, 
however, was thrust into center stage during the Second Missouri Com-
promise of 1821.32 As Missouri was petitioning to join the Union, its 
proposed constitution stated that it would be the duty of the Missouri 
                                                                                                                      
26 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
27 See id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
28 See generally, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 61 
(2011) (explaining the prevalence and nature of Comity Clause issues in the Antebellum 
Period and proposing that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should be interpreted as an 
extension of the Comity Clause); Kevin Maher, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, 
the Right to Travel, and the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 105 (2001) (proposing that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause was enacted, in part, because of the ineffectiveness of the Comity Clause in the 
Antebellum Period); Douglas G. Smith, The Privileges and Immunities Clause Article of IV, 
Section 2: Precursor of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 809 (1997) 
(explaining the application of the Comity Clause in the Antebellum Period and the states’ 
ways of circumscribing the Comity Clause’s protections). 
29 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 83–97; Maher, supra note 28, at 113–14; Smith, su-
pra note 28, at 816–22. 
30 See Articles of Confederation of 1781, art. IV. (stating that “the free inhabitants of 
each of these States . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in 
the several States”); Hamburger, supra note 28, at 75. 
31 Hamburger, supra note 28, at 74; see The Federalist No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(stating that the Comity Clause was “the basis of the Union” as it guaranteed an “equality 
of privileges and immunities, to which the citizens of the Union [would] be entitled”). 
32 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 83–86. 
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General Assembly, “as soon as may be, to pass such laws as may be nec-
essary . . . [t]o prevent free Negroes and mulattoes from coming to and 
settling in this state, under any pretext whatsoever.”33 Northerners 
viewed this provision as a clear violation of the Comity Clause and con-
vinced Congress to include in the Missouri Compromise the command 
that the state could not pass any laws that would exclude citizens from 
“the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such 
citizen is entitled under the Constitution.”34 
 Despite the wording of the Missouri Compromise, Missouri con-
tinued to attempt to find ways around the Comity Clause’s mandate.35 
Missouri and like-minded states asserted that free blacks were not citi-
zens of the United States and, thus, were not protected by the Comity 
Clause.36 Because many state courts held that free blacks were not citi-
zens of the United States and, therefore, not protected by the Comity 
Clause, the result was that there was no such thing as a free slave in a 
slave state.37 These decisions, and controversies surrounding them, 
served as catalysts for the now infamous 1856 Supreme Court decision 
Dred Scott v. Sandford.38 In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court subscribed to 
the Southerners’ belief, holding that free blacks were not citizens of the 
United States and were, thus, not guaranteed the protections of the 
Constitution—particularly the Comity Clause.39 
 In the years after the Dred Scott decision, numerous discussions 
were sparked over the meaning of citizenship in the United States.40 
Representative John Bingham, who would later draft the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1866, was no stranger to the larger debate on citizen-
                                                                                                                      
33 Mo. Const. of 1820, art. III, § 26; Hamburger, supra note 28, at 84 (citing Mo. 
Const. of 1820, art. III, § 26). 
34 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 86–87 (citing Res. of Mar. 2, 1821, 3 Stat. 695 (1821)). 
35 See id. at 88–89 (describing Missouri’s interpretation of citizenship in the years prior 
to the Dred Scott v. Sandford decision). 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 91–93. Missouri, and states like it, asserted that free blacks were not citizens 
of the United States and, thus, could not benefit from the protections of the Constitution. 
See id. Specifically, these states reasoned that the Comity Clause did not protect the non-
citizen free blacks. See id. Accordingly, when free blacks traveled from a “free state” to a 
“slave state,” the “slave state” was not bound to respect the free slave’s freedom that it de-
rived from its home state. See id. As a result, a free slave in a slave state was an impossibility. 
See id. 
38 See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856), overruled by U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Ham-
burger, supra note 28, at 97. 
39 Id. (stating that “[i]t does not by any means follow, because [the plaintiff, a freed 
slave,] has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of 
the United States”). 
40 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 111–12; Smith, supra note 28, at 817–20. 
2013] Sunk Cost Principles and the Privileges or Immunities Clause 1809 
ship in the years leading up to the Civil War.41 For example, in reaction 
to Oregon’s petition to join the Union in 1859, Bingham fiercely ar-
gued that all citizens of the states were inherently citizens of the United 
States and subject to the Constitution’s protections.42 Debates on the 
issues of citizenship and the Comity Clause continued for five more 
years, this time ending in bloodshed rather than compromise.43 
 At the close of the Civil War, Congress endeavored to enact protec-
tions to ensure that the degradation of African-Americans could never 
be resurrected and to prevent the states from becoming so fragmented 
as to succumb to secession again.44 Congress first attempted to reach 
this end with a bill, entitled: “A Bill to Declare and Protect All the Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States in the Several 
States.”45 This proposed bill “aimed to protect the privileges and im-
munities owed to citizens of the states under the Comity Clause on the 
ground that these were ‘the privileges and immunities of the citizens of 
the United States.’”46 The bill failed due to objections to its constitu-
tionality; some historians, however, believe that the bill was re-
incarnated into the Fourteenth Amendment as a constitutional, rather 
than a statutory, guarantee.47 
 Given the preeminence of the Comity Clause in the Antebellum 
Period and the continued discussion of the clause’s meaning during 
the Reconstruction Era, many historians believe that the Privileges or 
                                                                                                                      
41 Hamburger, supra note 28, at 111–12; Smith, supra note 28, at 817–20. John Bing-
ham represented Ohio in the House of Representatives. Hamburger, supra note 28, at 123. 
42 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 111–12; Smith, supra note 28, at 817–20. 
43 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 112–13. 
44 See id. at 115–16; Maher, supra note 28, at 114. 
45 See A Bill to Declare and Protect All the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the 
United States in the Several States, H.R. 437, 39th Cong. § 1 (1866); Hamburger, supra 
note 28, at 115. 
46 See H.R. 437 § 1; see also Political Affairs: National Politics: The Proposed Constitutional 
Amendment—What It Provides., N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1866, at 2 [hereinafter Political Affairs]. 
An article in the New York Times on November 15, 1866, described Bingham’s proposed 
amendment as “intend[ing] for the enforcement of the Second Section of the Fourth 
Article of the Constitution.” Political Affairs, supra, at 2. The article observed that “[w]e 
have seen, in the first number, what privileges and immunities were intended.” Id. 
47 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 115–16; Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 
Geo. L.J. 329, 409–10 (2011) (discussing bills in Congress that preceded the Fourteenth 
Amendment that indicate Congress’s eventual intention for the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause). 
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Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment served to guarantee 
the Comity Clause’s protection to all citizens of the United States.48 
B. Focus on the Reconstruction Era: The Ratification Debates 
 Some legal scholars, including Justice Thomas, believe that the 
ratification debates provide the key to understanding the intended 
meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.49 These scholars posit 
that constitutional amendments are written for adoption by the Ameri-
can people and, for this reason, the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
construed in light of how nineteenth-century voters would have under-
stood it.50 These legal historians argue that Reconstruction Era politics 
and the highly publicized ratification debates led to the broad public 
understanding that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to 
                                                                                                                      
48 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 143–44; Maher, supra note 28, at 113–15; Smith, su-
pra note 28, at 816–22; see infra notes 156–167 and accompanying text (discussing the 
scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause if interpreted with a focus on the Comity 
Clause). 
49 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3071–74 (2010) (Thomas, J., con-
curring); Brief of Petitioner at 21–26, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) 
(No. 08-1521) [hereinafter Petitioner Brief]; Brief for Goldwater Institute & Scharf-Norton 
Center for Constitutional Government, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners 21–
23, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter Gold-
water Brief]. Justice Thomas has written many articles supporting a revamping of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause both while on the bench, and before. See David C. Durst, Justice 
Clarence Thomas’s Interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause: McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago and the Future of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U. Tol. L. Rev. 933, 937–38, 941–42 
(2011) (describing the progression of Justice Thomas’s thoughts on Originalism and the 
plain reading of the Constitution, most particularly, of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause). 
50 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3072 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that when one inter-
prets the meaning of a constitutional provision, “the goal is to discern the most likely pub-
lic understanding of a particular provision at the time it was adopted,” and that the state-
ments by legislators can help “to the extent they demonstrate the manner in which the 
public used or understood a particular word or phrase”); Petitioner Brief, supra note 49, at 
15 (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 
overruled on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (quoting Eisner v. Macomb-
er, 252 U.S. 189, 220 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(stating that “an amendment to the Constitution should be read in a sense most obvious to 
the common understanding at the time of its adoption[,] . . . [f]or it was for public adop-
tion that it was proposed”); Goldwater Brief, supra note 49, at 14 (citing United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)). Under Article V of the Constitution, a proposed con-
stitutional amendment will be enacted if the legislatures of three fourths of the states vote 
to adopt it. U.S. Const. art. V (stating that a proposed constitutional amendment “shall be 
valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the legisla-
tures of three fourths of the several states”). 
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incorporate the Constitution’s first eight amendments against state in-
fringement.51 
 Following the conclusion of the Civil War, President Andrew John-
son issued a proclamation granting amnesty to all former Confeder-
ates.52 Issued on Christmas Day of 1868, President Johnson’s presiden-
tial pardon guaranteed “to all and to every person who directly or 
indirectly participated in the late insurrection or rebellion, a full par-
don and amnesty for the offence of treason . . . with restoration of all 
rights, privileges, and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which 
have been made in pursuance thereof.”53 This pardon and amnesty, 
not surprisingly, headlined every newspaper, and introduced “privileges 
and immunities” to the American voters as a term of art.54 As Johnson’s 
pardon was undeniably the most publicized event in its day, the Ameri-
can voter would likely have viewed this new term of art as inextricably 
linked to those rights under the Constitution, as Johnson had done.55 
 In addition to Johnson’s pardon, scholars highlight speeches made 
during the ratification debates that illuminate not only the drafters’ 
intent, but given the wide publication of those speeches, the public’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 The principle drafters 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, Representative Bingham, delivered a 
speech to the House of Representatives in February 1866 to discuss his 
first draft of the amendment.57 In his speech, Bingham discussed the 
                                                                                                                      
51 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3071 (Thomas, J., concurring); Richard L. Aynes, Ink Blot 
or Not: The Meaning of Privileges and/or Immunities, 11 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1295, 1302–03, 
1309 (2009) (proposing that the ratification debates suggest that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause was intended to give the federal government the ability to enforce the Constitu-
tion against state action); Christian B. Corrigan, McDonald v. City of Chicago: Did Justice 
Thomas Resurrect the Privileges or Immunities Clause from the Dead? (And Did Justice Scalia Kill It 
Again?), 60 U. Kan. L. Rev. 435, 450–53 (2011) (endorsing Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
in McDonald as indicative of how the Court could revamp its understanding of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause to better reflect an originalist reading of the clause). 
52 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3071 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Proclamation No. 15, 15 
Stat. 711–12 (Dec. 25, 1868). 
53 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3071 (Thomas, J., concurring); Proclamation No. 15, 15 Stat. 
711–12 (Dec. 25, 1868) (emphasis added). 
54 See, e.g., AMNESTY. Important Proclamation by the President. Pardon and Amnesty Granted 
to All the Late Rebels, N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1868, at 3; see also Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 
98 Geo. L.J. 1241, 1243–44 (2010) (explaining the usage of the term “Privileges or Immu-
nities” in both the Antebellum and Reconstruction Eras). 
55 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3071 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lash, supra note 54, at 
1243–44. 
56 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3072–74 (Thomas, J., concurring); Petitioner Brief, supra 
note 49, at 27–31; Goldwater Brief, supra note 49, at 21–22. 
57 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088–90 (1866). 
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1833 case of Barron v. City of Baltimore, in which the Supreme Court de-
termined that the Bill of Rights did not protect citizens from state ac-
tion.58 Bingham, who considered the Barron outcome unjust, stated 
that the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to 
enforce the Bill of Rights against the states.59 This speech was broadly 
distributed to the American people in pamphlet form and was further 
reported in the national newspapers.60 Although this draft of Bing-
ham’s amendment was later tabled, some historians believe that it 
served as a precursor to what would become the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and identifies what Bingham was ultimately aiming to achieve.61 
                                                                                                                     
 After Bingham redrafted the Fourteenth Amendment to include 
the wording that was ultimately adopted, Senator Jacob Howard deliv-
ered a speech to the Senate to introduce the new proposal.62 Senator 
Howard first explained that despite the breadth of rights and privileges 
that the Constitution provides to its citizens, there existed “no power 
given in the Constitution to enforce and carry out any of [those] guar-
antees [against the states].”63 Howard further articulated that, “the 
great object” of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
act as a restraint on the states; according to Howard, the section served 
as “a general prohibition upon all the States, as such, from abridging 
the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United States.”64 
 
58 Id. See generally Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (finding that 
constitutional provisions, specially the Fifth Amendment, applied only to federal action). 
59 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088 (1866). Representative Bingham stated to 
the House of Representatives that the purpose of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was 
“to arm the Congress of the United States, by the consent of the people of the United 
States, with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today.” Id. 
60 See, e.g., Thirty-Ninth Congress: First Session, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1866, at 8 [hereinafter 
Thirty-Ninth Congress]; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3072 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stat-
ing that the speech was distributed in pamphlet form). The New York Times reported on 
Representative Bingham’s speech regarding the proposed constitutional amendment: 
Mr. Bingham said . . . [i]f such legislation had been on the statute book so as 
to enforce the Constitutional requirements in every State, the rebellion which 
had charred and blackened the land would have been an impossibility. The 
proposed amendment imposed no obligation on any State nor on any citizen 
in a State which was not now enjoined upon them by the very letter of the 
Constitution. It was impossible for man to frame words more obligatory than 
those already in the Constitution . . . . 
Thirty-Ninth Congress, supra. 
61 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3072 (Thomas, J., concurring); Lash, supra note 47, at 
409. 
62 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765–67 (1866). 
63 Id. at 2765. 
64 Id. at 2765–66. 
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Howard described the rights to be protected by the clause as those 
rights already established by the Comity Clause and, additionally, those 
rights “secured . . . by the first eight amendments of the Constitu-
tion.”65 Much like Bingham’s speech, Howard’s speech was widely cir-
culated in the most popular newspapers of the time.66 
                                                                                                                     
 Given the clarity of the drafters’ speeches on what they intended 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean, coupled with the wide 
publication of those speeches to the American public, many historians 
subscribe to Bingham and Howard’s interpretation of the clause.67 As 
such, these legal historians believe that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause was intended to incorporate the first eight amendments of the 
Constitution against the states.68 
C. Focus on Federalism as a Guiding Theme 
 Some legal historians view the Civil War as a battle fought over 
ideological differences.69 In line with the common understanding of 
“to the victor go the spoils,” these historians believe that the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be read in the context of the Republican construc-
 
65 Id. at 2765; see Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) 
(holding that the Comity Clause protects certain fundamental rights and establishing cri-
teria to determine whether a right is fundamental). Senator Howard discussed how in 
addition to the rights protected by the Comity Clause, as decided by the 1823 Circuit 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision in Corfield v. Coryell, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause would cover additional rights: 
To these privileges and immunities, whatever they may be[,] . . . should be 
added the personal rights guarantied and secured by the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution; such as the freedom of speech and of the press; 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances, [and] . . . the right to keep and to bear arms[.] 
Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866). 
66 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020 at 3073–74 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
67 See id. at 3073–74 (Thomas, J., concurring); Aynes, supra note 51, at 1302–05; Corri-
gan, supra note 51, at 450–53. 
68 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3073–74 (Thomas, J., concurring); Petitioner Brief, supra 
note 49, at 26; Goldwater Brief, supra note 49, at 25; Aynes, supra note 51, at 1302–03; Cor-
rigan, supra note 51, at 436–37. 
69 See Brief for Cato Institute & Pacific Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 10–11, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08–1521) 
[hereinafter Cato Brief]; William J. Rich, Why “Privileges or Immunities”? An Explanation of the 
Framers’ Intent, 42 Akron L. Rev. 1111, 1126–27 (2009) (arguing that the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause was intended, in a very broad sense, to ensure state compliance under the 
powers of the federal government). 
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tion of federalism, which was a popular ideology in the North during 
the Antebellum Period.70 
 Prior to the Civil War, the United States was fiercely divided into 
two political ideologies: the various southern states’ rights parties, and 
the Free Soil Party, which later became the Republican Party.71 The 
Republican Party, and many Northerners who supported it, subscribed 
to a theory of paramount national citizenship: the idea that all the peo-
ple of the United States comprised a single sovereign nation and were 
not simply a conglomerate of separate state citizens.72 Accordingly, this 
theory asserted that natural and traditional common law rights applied 
to all Americans as a result of their shared federal citizenship.73 This 
prong of the theory was important because it naturally produced the 
idea that a person’s rights were protected because they were American, 
not because they were a citizen of a particular state.74 As a result, their 
rights were protected by the federal government, and not susceptible to 
the whims of their state.75 
 Those subscribing to the states’ rights view, by contrast, believed 
that states were solely responsible for defining and protecting the rights 
of each person.76 Whereas the Republican Party pined for a strong na-
tional government and subsidiary state governments, the proponents 
of the states’ rights view pushed for just the opposite.77 After the Civil 
War, however, many Northerners rejected the notion of strong state 
governments, as many of them viewed unyielding state power as a 
source of the war.78 
 With this understanding of the ideological differences, some legal 
historians believe that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Im-
munities Clause was an attempt to incorporate the theory of para-
                                                                                                                      
70 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 5–6; Rich, supra note 69, at 1112–13. 
71 See Trisha Olson, The Natural Law Foundation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 48 Ark. L. Rev. 347, 394 (1995). 
72 See id. at 367 (describing the viewpoints of “reformers” in the Antebellum Period as 
those who articulated that national citizenship was paramount to state citizenship). 
73 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 6; Olson, supra note 71, at 367; Rebecca E. Zietlow, 
Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights and John Bingham’s Theory of Citizenship, 36 Akron 
L. Rev. 717, 719–21 (2003) (explaining Bingham’s understanding of citizenship). 
74 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 6; Olson, supra note 71, at 367–69. 
75 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10–11; Olson, supra note 71, at 368. 
76 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10, 13–14. 
77 Id. at 5. 
78 See id. at 10–11; Rich, supra note 69, at 719–20 (discussing the changing views on the 
strength of state power as a result of the Civil War). 
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mount national identity into the Constitution.79 To these scholars, the 
layout of the Fourteenth Amendment’s first clause makes perfect sense 
to support this view: the amendment opens by defining the scope of 
American citizenship and then guarantees federal protection against 
state infringement of those “privileges or immunities” that are derived 
from this national citizenship.80 
 As such, these historians believe that in adopting the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause, the Republican drafters intended to constitutional-
ize the preeminence of federal citizenship over state citizenship.81 Ad-
ditionally, they believe that the drafters intended to taper the states’ 
sovereignty and ability to define the scope of a person’s rights, hoping 
that this issue would never again cause the states to engage in a bloody 
civil war.82 
 Accordingly, these legal historians believe that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to incorporate the entirety of the Bill of 
Rights against state infringement.83 Further, these scholars view the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause as incorporating the notion of para-
mount national citizenship as a theme within the federalism structure, 
thereby ensuring that the constitutional interpretation of nationality 
and federally protected individual rights would reign supreme.84 
II. Judicial Interpretation of the Privileges  
or Immunities Clause 
 Although legal historians may disagree on the intended purpose of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the U.S. Constitution—whether 
it was intended to apply the Comity Clause to all citizens or to incorpo-
rate the Bill of Rights against the states—historians can agree on one 
thing: the clause was intended to have significance.85 Only through un-
derstanding what legal historians perceive to be the intention of the 
                                                                                                                      
79 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 16–17; Kimberly C. Shankman & Roger Pilon, Reviv-
ing the Privileges or Immunities Clause to Redress the Balance Among States, Individuals, and the 
Federal Government, 3 Tex. Rev. L & Pol. 1, 25 (1998) (explaining how the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was largely intended as a mechanism to protect one’s national citizen-
ship); Zietlow, supra note 73, at 737–38. 
80 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10–11; Shankman & Pilon, supra note 79, at 24–26. 
81 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 5–6; Rich, supra note 69, at 1126–27. 
82 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10–11; Shankman & Pilon, supra note 79, at 24–25. 
83 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 5–6; Rich, supra note 69, at 1126–27; Shankman & Pi-
lon, supra note 79, at 24–25. 
84 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 5–6; Rich, supra note 69, at 1126–27; Shankman & Pi-
lon, supra note 79, at 24–25. 
85 See supra notes 19–84 and accompanying text. 
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drafters can one recognize how disappointing the 1872 Supreme Court 
decision in Slaughter-House and its progeny are.86 Not only did the Su-
preme Court shelve the Privileges or Immunities Clause into its narrow 
scope in the nineteenth century, but the Court has since refused most 
modern attempts to revive the clause in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries.87 
A. Initial Irrelevance: Slaughter-House & Cruikshank 
 In 1872, four years after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court decided the three cases known collectively as 
The Slaughter-House Cases.88 In 1869, the Louisiana legislature passed a 
statute that granted the city of New Orleans the right to create a slaugh-
terhouse corporation, which was granted the exclusive right to run 
slaughterhouse operations in the city.89 All butchers had to pay a fee in 
order to use the facility for slaughtering purposes.90 In 1870, various 
butchers’ associations sued the city, claiming that the statute created a 
monopoly.91 The butchers argued that this monopoly violated their 
fundamental right to exercise their trade and, thus, infringed on their 
Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities.92 
 Justice Samuel Miller, writing for the 5–4 Court, ruled that the 
Louisiana statute did not violate the Privileges or Immunities Clause.93 
Justice Miller first articulated that there existed a difference between 
citizens of the United States and citizens of a state.94 Given these two 
distinct citizenships, Miller asserted that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause could only protect the privileges or immunities that stem from 
                                                                                                                      
86 See Butchers’ Benevolent Assoc. of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing 
& Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–80 (1872) [hereinafter Slaughter-House]; 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3073–74 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501–02 (1999); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 551–
53 (1875). 
87 See Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 78–80; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 (plu-
rality opinion); Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503; see also id. at 527 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
Slaughter-House Cases sapped the [Privileges or Immunities] Clause of any meaning.”). 
88 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 57–58; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. 
89 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 59. 
90 Id. at 59–60. 
91 Id. at 60. 
92 Id. at 60, 66. The butchers in Slaughter-House argued that the monopoly granted an 
exclusive privilege to engage in the butcher trade to some members of the community, but 
denied the privilege to others. Id. at 60. 
93 Id. at 80. 
94 Id. at 74–75. 
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one’s federal citizenship.95 Justice Miller suggested that the privileges 
or immunities to be protected by the federal government were those 
“which owe their existence to the Federal government, its National 
character, its Constitution, or its laws.”96 Justice Miller continued to list 
several other rights, in dicta, that may be protected by the clause, in-
cluding the rights to sue the government, to free access of seaports, and 
to peaceably assemble.97 
 Justice Miller reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment must 
have been intended to protect only those privileges that stem from 
one’s federal citizenship.98 Specifically, Justice Miller concluded that 
the drafters could not possibly have intended to burden the federal 
government to become a “perpetual censor upon all legislation of the 
States.”99 Applying this reasoning to the case, Justice Miller concluded 
that the privilege of operating a slaughterhouse did not owe “its exis-
tence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitu-
tion, or its laws.”100 Rather, the privilege was a result of the legitimate 
police power of the states.101 Accordingly, Justice Miller reasoned that 
operating a slaughterhouse business was a privilege of state, not federal, 
                                                                                                                      
95 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74–75. 
96 Id. at 78–79. 
97 Id. at 79. Justice Miller elaborated on further rights that might be protected by the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause: 
It is said to be the right of the citizen of this great country, protected by im-
plied guarantees of its Constitution, to come to the seat of government to as-
sert any claim he may have upon that government, to transact any business he 
may have with it, to seek its protection, to share its offices, to engage in ad-
ministering its functions. He has the right of free access to its seaports, 
through which all operations of foreign commerce are conducted, to the sub-
treasuries, land offices, and courts of justice in the several States. 
. . . . 
 Another privilege of a citizen of the United States is to demand the care 
and protection of the Federal government over his life, liberty, and property 
when on the high seas or within the jurisdiction of a foreign government[;] 
. . . to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, [and] the 
privileges of the writ of habeas corpus are rights of the citizens guaranteed by 
the Federal Constitution. The right to use the navigable waters of the United 
States, however they may penetrate the territory of the several States, all 
rights secured to our citizens by treaties with foreign nations, are dependent 
upon citizenship of the United States, and not citizenship of a State. 
Id. at 79–80 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
98 Id. at 77–79. 
99 Id. at 78. 
100 Id. at 74–75, 79. 
101 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74–75, 79. 
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citizenship and thus did not warrant protection from the federal gov-
ernment.102 
 Justices Stephen Field and Joseph Bradley strongly dissented to 
Justice Miller’s reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.103 Field 
believed the majority’s interpretation afforded no additional protection 
than was available prior to the Clause’s adoption.104 Accordingly, Justice 
Field concluded that Miller’s interpretation of the clause made it a 
“vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing.”105 Alterna-
tively, Justice Field believed the clause was meant to have a “profound 
significance and consequence,” and was intended to protect the “natu-
ral and inalienable rights” that “of right belong to the citizens of all free 
governments.”106 As such, Justice Field subscribed to a view of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause that mirrored, yet expanded, the scope of 
the Comity Clause.107 Justice Bradley also contended that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause provided broader substantive protections than 
                                                                                                                      
102 Id. at 80. 
103 See id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
104 Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field, commenting on Miller’s interpretation 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, stated: 
[I]f this . . . only refers, as held by the majority of the court in their opinion, 
to such privileges and immunities as were before its adoption specially desig-
nated in the Constitution or necessarily implied as belonging to citizens of 
the United States, it was a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished noth-
ing, and most unnecessarily excited Congress and the people on its passage. 
With privileges and immunities thus designated or implied no State could ev-
er have interfered by its laws, and no new constitutional provision was re-
quired to inhibit such interference. 
Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 96–97. 
107 Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 100–01 (Field, J., dissenting); see Michael Kent 
Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases 
Without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 
1, 80–82 (1996) (stating that Justice Field understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
as requiring the states to treat their citizens equally); supra notes 26–48 and accompanying 
text (describing an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that focuses on 
the Comity Clause). Justice Field articulated the scope of privileges or immunities pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment in terms of the Comity Clause’s scope: 
What the [Comity Clause] did for the protection of the citizens of one State 
against hostile and discriminating legislation of other States, the fourteenth 
amendment does for the protection of every citizen of the United States 
against hostile and discriminating legislation against him in favor of others, 
whether they reside in the same or in different States. 
Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 100–01 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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the majority found.108 Bradley believed the clause was written to protect 
the fundamental rights of citizens and, thus, incorporated the protec-
tions granted in the Constitution and its early amendments against 
state infringement.109 
 Although Justice Miller’s opinion in Slaughter-House narrowly char-
acterized the reach of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Miller still 
recognized, albeit in dicta, that amendments in the Bill of Rights could 
be protected by the clause.110 Only three years later, however, in United 
States v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court narrowed the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause even further.111 
 In 1873, an armed militia attacked and killed a group of African-
Americans that had assembled to protest at a Louisiana courthouse.112 
The victims’ families petitioned that the state militia had deprived the 
victims of their privileges as American citizens to peaceably assemble 
pursuant to the First Amendment.113 The victims relied on Justice Mil-
ler’s opinion in Slaughter-House to argue that the right to peaceably as-
semble stemmed from one’s national citizenship and was, therefore, a 
                                                                                                                      
108 Id. at 118–20 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
109 Id. Justice Bradley articulated the scope of the privileges and immunities that the 
Fourteenth Amendment should protect: 
The Constitution, it is true, as it stood prior to the recent amendments, speci-
fies, in terms, only a few of the personal privileges and immunities of citizens, 
but they are very comprehensive in their character . . . such as the right of ha-
beas corpus, the right of trial by jury, of free exercise of religious worship, the 
right of free speech and a free press, the right peaceably to assemble for the 
discussion of public measures, the right to be secure against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, and above all, and including almost all the rest, the 
right of not being deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
These, and still others, are specified in the original Constitution, or in the 
early amendments of it, as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of 
the United States, or, what is still stronger for the force of the argument, the 
rights of all persons, whether citizens or not. 
Id. at 118–19. 
110 Id. at 79 (majority opinion) (enumerating in dicta the rights that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause may protect, including certain provisions of the Bill of Rights). 
111 See Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 550–51. 
112 Robert C. Palmer, The Parameters of Constitutional Reconstruction: Slaughter-House, 
Cruikshank, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 1984 U. Ill. L. Rev. 739, 763; see Cruikshank, 92 
U.S. at 550–51. 
113 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548–50; Palmer, supra note 112, at 763; see U.S. Const. 
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”). 
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privilege protected from state infringement by the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause.114 
 Rejecting the families’ arguments, the Supreme Court ruled that 
only the right to peaceably assemble to petition the national govern-
ment was an attribute of one’s national citizenship and, therefore, pro-
tected by the federal government.115 As such, the Court held that the 
right to peaceably assemble, for any reason other than petitioning 
Congress, is a privilege of state citizenship, and thereby could not be 
regulated by the federal government.116 In ruling that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause did not protect American citizens from state action, 
the Supreme Court dashed hopes for the clause’s relevance following 
the Slaughter-House decision.117 
B. Modern Hints at Revival: Saenz & McDonald 
 Nearly 130 years passed before the Supreme Court would seriously 
consider the scope and meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
again.118 In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Saenz v. Roe partly on the 
basis of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but relied on the clause in 
a more restrained way than legal historians may have hoped.119 
 In 1992, the California legislature enacted a statute that limited 
the welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents in the state.120 
For a family residing in California for less than a year, the statute lim-
ited the family’s welfare benefits to the equivalent payable to the family 
in its previous state of residence.121 Three families, having recently 
moved to California, sued the state, claiming that the statute’s dur-
ational residency requirement was unconstitutional.122 The plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                      
114 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 551–52; see Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79. 
115 Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 552. 
116 Id. at 552–53. 
117 See id.; Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 79 (indicating, in dicta, that the Bill of 
Rights may be protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
118 See generally Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36; Saenz, 526 U.S. 489. 
119 See 526 U.S. at 503–04. 
120 Id. at 492. 
121 Id. at 493–94. This statute was passed in an effort to reduce the state’s budget, while 
also modestly reducing its already generous welfare package relative to its neighboring 
states. Id. For example, one petitioner moved to California from Louisiana. Id. Given her 
circumstances, if she had lived in California for more than one year, her family would re-
ceive $641 in welfare benefits. Id. Under the California statute, because her family had 
lived in California for less than twelve months, the family was entitled to their correspond-
ing benefits in Louisiana, which totaled $190. Id. at 494. 
122 Id. at 494. 
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argued that this statute violated their right to travel and, thus, infringed 
upon their Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities.123 
 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 6–2 Court, ruled that the 
California statute unconstitutionally restricted newly arrived California 
citizens from enjoying the privileges and immunities available to all 
other California citizens.124 Noting the stark disagreement over the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause’s meaning, as expressed in the majority 
and dissenting opinions in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Stevens 
nonetheless stated that the clause had always been understood to pro-
tect that component of the right to travel.125 Justice Stevens found sup-
port for this proposition by referring to both Justice Miller’s majority 
opinion and Justice Bradley’s dissenting opinion in Slaughter-House.126 
 Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Thomas dissented to 
Justice Stevens’s reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.127 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist questioned the majority’s reliance on a clause that the 
Court had almost wholly ignored in its 130-year tenure.128 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist determined that the California statute did not violate any 
constitutional provision and was in line with the Court’s long-standing 
acceptance of certain bona fide residence requirements.129 
 Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s decision as attributing 
meaning to the Privileges or Immunities Clause that was “unintended 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted and ratified.”130 Tho-
mas posited that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was both intended 
                                                                                                                      
123 Id. at 498–502. 
124 Id. at 502. 
125 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503 (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80). 
126 Id. (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 80) (noting that in Slaughter-House, 
“Justice Miller explained that one of the privileges conferred by this Clause ‘is that a citi-
zen of the United States can, of his own volition, become a citizen of any State of the Un-
ion by a bonâ fide residence therein, with the same rights as other citizens of that State’”); 
id. (citing Slaughter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 112–13 (Bradley, J., dissenting)) (noting 
that in Slaughter-House, “Justice Bradley, in dissent, used even stronger language to make 
the same point [as Justice Miller]: . . . ‘A citizen of the United States has a perfect constitu-
tional right to go to and reside in any State he chooses, and to claim citizenship therein, 
and an equality of the rights with every other citizen’”). 
127 Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
128 Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “[b]ecause I do not think any 
provision of the Constitution—and surely not a provision relied upon for only the second 
time since its enactment 130 years ago—requires this result, I dissent”). 
129 Id. at 518–21 (citing Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406–09 (1975) (holding that one-
year residence requirements prior to obtaining a divorce in a state court was constitu-
tional); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 411, 453–454 (1973) (holding that a state’s establishment 
of reasonable criteria to determine in-state status for education requirements was constitu-
tional)). 
130 Id. at 521 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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and understood to be a corollary to the established Comity Clause doc-
trine.131 Accordingly, Thomas cited to Comity Clause precedent to rea-
son that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended not to guar-
antee “equal access to all public benefits,” but to protect “only 
fundamental rights that belong to all citizens of the United States.”132 In 
his conclusion, Thomas noted that he believed that the “the demise of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause” had led to “disarray” in Four-
teenth Amendment jurisprudence.133 Accordingly, he stated that he 
“would be open to reevaluating its meaning in an appropriate case.”134 
 In 2010, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, scholars were hopeful that it was the “appropriate case” to 
which Thomas had alluded to in Saenz.135 Specifically, scholars believed 
the Court would overturn Slaughter-House in the course of incorporating 
the Second Amendment to the states.136 These scholars mounted oppo-
sition to Slaughter-House by means of the numerous briefs filed in sup-
port of the petitioners.137 Proponents of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, however, would remain disappointed by the Court’s decision to 
leave the Slaughter-House decision unscathed.138 
                                                                                                                      
131 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 524–26 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
132 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 525–26 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing Cor-
field v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230). 
133 Id. at 527–28. 
134 Id. at 528. Justice Thomas elaborated that prior to reevaluating the meaning of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, “[W]e should endeavor to understand what the Framers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that it meant. We should also consider whether 
the Clause should displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection and 
substantive due process jurisprudence.” Id. 
135 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. 3020; Saenz, 526 U.S. at 527–28 (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 4; Goldwater Brief, supra note 49, at 13–14. 
136 See U.S. Const. amend. II; McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3020 (plurality opinion); Slaugh-
ter-House, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 36. 
137 See generally, e.g., Petitioner Brief, supra note 49 (relying on the ratification debates 
to urge the Supreme Court that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to in-
corporate the Bill of Rights); Cato Brief, supra note 69 (relying on the theory of para-
mount national citizenship to argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended 
to incorporate the Bill of Rights); Goldwater Brief, supra note 49 (proposing that the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause was intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights because such an 
interpretation was the ordinary and normal reading of the clause at the time of its adop-
tion). 
138 Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 (plurality opinion) (stating that the Su-
preme Court “decline[s] to disturb the Slaughterhouse holding”), with Cato Brief, supra note 
69, at 33 (concluding that the Supreme Court should overturn Slaughter-House) and Gold-
water Brief, supra note 49, at 5 (same). 
2013] Sunk Cost Principles and the Privileges or Immunities Clause 1823 
 In McDonald, a group of petitioners challenged aspects of Chi-
cago’s gun registration law.139 The petitioners argued, in part, that the 
city’s restrictions infringed on their privilege to bear arms, which 
stemmed from their federal citizenship.140 Although the Court found 
that the Second Amendment was incorporated against the states, the 
Court found this right via the Due Process Clause, rather than through 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.141 
 Both in oral arguments and briefly within the majority’s opinion, 
the Supreme Court identified its discomfort with the idea of overturn-
ing Slaughter-House and resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause as preeminent substantive authority.142 Justice Antonin Scalia 
quipped at oral arguments that using the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause in McDonald would be “contrary to 140 years of our jurispru-
dence;” he then asked, “Why do you want to undertake that burden 
instead of just arguing substantive due process? Which, as much as I 
think it’s wrong, I have—even I have acquiesced in it.”143 The same atti-
tude of acquiesce was mirrored in Justice Samuel Alito’s plurality opin-
ion, in which Alito noted that, “For many decades, the question of the 
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state infringe-
ment has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause of that Amend-
ment and not under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. We therefore 
decline to disturb the Slaughter-House holding.”144 
 The only justice in support of employing the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause as a path to recognizing the petitioners’ Second Amend-
ment rights was Justice Thomas.145 Justice Thomas concurred in the 
decision that the Second Amendment was incorporated against the 
states, but noted: “I believe there is a more straightforward path to this 
conclusion, one that is more faithful to the Fourteenth’s Amendment’s 
text and history.”146 Justice Thomas proceeded to cite the ratification 
debates to articulate that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to 
                                                                                                                      
139 Id. at 3026–27. In McDonald, the Court considered the constitutionality of Chicago’s 
gun registration law that “prohibit[ed] registration of most handguns, thus effectively 
banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside[d] in the City.” Id. at 
3026. 
140 Id. at 3028. 
141 Id. at 3050. 
142 See id. at 3030–31; McDonald Transcript, supra note 8, at 7. 
143 McDonald Transcript, supra note 8, at 7. 
144 McDonald, 130 S. Ct at 3030–31 (plurality opinion). 
145 McDonald, 130 S. Ct at 3059–60 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
146 Id. 
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incorporate the Bill of Rights against state action.147 Although Justice 
Thomas made a persuasive argument—standing alone, his concur-
rence was a far cry from the outcome for which Slaughter-House critics 
had hoped.148 
III. A World Without Slaughter-House 
 Most legal historians can agree that the Court has mischaracter-
ized the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the 1872 Supreme Court 
decision in Slaughter-House and its progeny.149 Each historical retelling 
of the ratification period, however, leads to a different conclusion 
about what the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause would be 
today if the court overturned Slaughter-House.150 Nevertheless, the point 
appears to be moot, as most of what historians claim the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause was meant to achieve has since been accomplished 
through alternative means in the 140 years after Slaughter-House.151 In 
this way, overturning Slaughter-House today would add very little new 
substance to our “constitutional constellation.”152 
 Section A discusses how the historical focus on the Comity Clause 
would affect the scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and how 
such concerns have since been addressed through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.153 Section B discusses how the 
historical focus on the ratification debates would affect the scope of the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause, and how such concerns have since 
been handled by the selective incorporation of most of the Bill of 
                                                                                                                      
147 See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text (summarizing Justice Thomas’s ar-
gument that the ratification debates highlight the drafters’ intention that the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause incorporated the Constitution’s first eight amendments against state 
action). 
148 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct at 3088 (Thomas, J., concurring); Petitioner Brief, supra 
note 49, at 15–16; Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10–11; Goldwater Brief, supra note 49, at 21. 
149 See Butchers’ Benevolent Assoc. of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing 
& Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78–80 (1872) [hereinafter Slaughter-House 
Cases]; supra notes 19–84 and accompanying text. 
150 Compare supra notes 26–48 and accompanying text (explaining the historical retell-
ing of the Antebellum Period with a focus on the Comity Clause issues), with supra notes 
49–68 and accompanying text (explaining the historical retelling of the Reconstruction 
Era with a focus on the Fourteenth Amendment ratification debates), and supra notes 69–
84 and accompanying text (explaining the historical retelling of the Antebellum and Re-
construction Eras with a focus on the theory of a paramount national citizenship). 
151 See infra notes 156–213 and accompanying text. 
152 See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); see also infra notes 156–213 
and accompanying text. 
153 See infra notes 156–174 and accompanying text. 
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Rights.154 Finally, Section C discusses how the historical focus on feder-
alism as a theme in the Reconstruction Era would affect the scope of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and how much of the federalism 
concerns have since been quelled through a gradual shift in power 
from the states to the federal government.155 
A. The Comity Clause Approach 
 Given both the similarities in wording between the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause and the Comity Clause, and the prevalence of Com-
ity Clause issues involving slaves in the Antebellum Period, many legal 
historians believe that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should be 
tied to the rights protected by the Comity Clause.156 Therefore, these 
historians first believe that the Fourteenth Amendment grants national 
citizenship to African-Americans.157 Furthermore, they believe that the 
Fourteenth Amendment linked the Comity Clause protection to this 
newly recognized national citizenship.158 Consequently, by tying the 
Comity Clause protection to one’s national citizenship, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause would arm Congress with the power to enforce the 
Comity Clause against state infringement.159 In this way, Congress 
would have the power to prevent any attempts by states to rout the 
Comity Clause, such as the state action allowed by the Supreme Court 
in its 1856 decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford.160 
 Whereas the Comity Clause protected the “privileges and immuni-
ties” that were a result of one’s state citizenship, these historians inter-
pret the Fourteenth Amendment to secure those “privileges or immu-
nities” that are a product of one’s national citizenship.161 Inherent in 
this interpretation is the idea that the definition of which rights were 
                                                                                                                      
154 See infra notes 175–196 and accompanying text. 
155 See infra notes 197–213 and accompanying text. 
156 See supra notes 26–48 and accompanying text. 
157 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside.”); see Hamburger, supra note 28, at 122; Maher, supra note 28, at 113–
14; Smith, supra note 28, at 885–89. 
158 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States . . . .”); see supra notes 
26–48 and accompanying text. 
159 See supra notes 26–48 and accompanying text. 
160 See 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856), overruled by U.S. Const. amend. XIV; supra 
notes 26–48 and accompanying text (explaining that before the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment, states could narrowly define citizenship to avoid bestowing the Com-
ity Clause’s protections to whole classes of people). 
161 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 133–34. 
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“privileges or immunities” would be less susceptible to public opinion 
than in the Antebellum Period.162 The Comity Clause was unable to 
protect the fundamental right of freedom in Dred Scott because Missouri 
was able to narrowly define “privileges and immunities” and “citi-
zen.”163 As such, these historians believe that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause was an effort to arm Congress with the power to prevent 
states from dictating who was a citizen and what rights he deserved.164 
 Accordingly, these historians believe that the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause should be held to protect the same rights that the Comity 
Clause has long been found to protect.165 The Comity Clause’s juris-
prudence stems from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania 1823 decision in Corfield v. Coryell.166 In Corfield, Judge 
Bushrod Washington determined that the privileges and immunities 
protected by the Comity Clause includes those rights “which are, in 
their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all 
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the 
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time 
of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign.”167 
                                                                                                                      
 
162 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405 (finding that a freed slave’s state citizenship 
did not naturally confer national citizenship onto the slave and, therefore, the slave was 
not entitled to the Constitution’s protections); Hamburger, supra note 28, at 133–34. 
163 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405–07; Hamburger, supra note 28, at 91–93; su-
pra notes 35–37 and accompanying text (describing the way in which Missouri and like-
minded states narrowly defined citizenship to find that the Constitution’s protections did 
not apply to freed slaves). 
164 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405–07; Hamburger, supra note 28, at 116; Ma-
her, supra note 28, at 113–14. 
165 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 83–97; Maher, supra note 28, at 113–14; Smith, su-
pra note 28, at 816. 
166 See 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230); John Harrison, Reconstructing 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1398–01 (1992) (explaining, generally, 
the state of Comity Clause jurisprudence and its development prior to the ratification of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
167 6 F. Cas. at 551 (emphasis added). Judge Washington attempted to enumerate 
some of the fundamental rights protected under the Comity Clause: 
What these fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious 
than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under 
the following general heads: Protection by the government; the enjoyment of 
life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, 
and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such 
restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the 
whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any 
other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or oth-
erwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and 
maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dis-
pose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes 
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 Interpreting the Comity Clause as a mechanism to protect “fun-
damental” rights bears substantial similarity to the interpretation of 
the Due Process Clause that has developed in the decades after 
Slaughter-House.168 Although its name leads one to believe that the 
Due Process Clause is meant to protect procedure, our constitutional 
jurisprudence has identified this clause as protecting a broad range of 
substantive rights as well, including those rights that would likely have 
been protected under a Comity Clause-focused Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.169 The Supreme Court has held under the Due Process 
Clause that some liberties are so “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty” that they are deemed to be “fundamental” and that the gov-
ernment, therefore, cannot infringe upon them unless strict scrutiny 
is met.170 
 Further, the Court has used the Due Process Clause to protect 
fundamental rights even in the face of harsh public criticism.171 In 
                                                                                                                      
 
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be men-
tioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which 
are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be 
fundamental: to which may be added, the elective franchise, as regulated and 
established by the laws or constitution of the state in which it is to be exer-
cised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speak-
ing, privileges and immunities . . . . 
Id. at 551–52. 
168 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997). In the 1997 Su-
preme Court decision in Washington v. Glucksberg, Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated that 
the Due Process Clause “specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, 
objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ . . . and ‘implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 
(1977); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled on other grounds by Benton 
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1968)). 
169 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000) (holding that a parent had a “funda-
mental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her [children]” pursuant to the 
Due Process Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that “marriage is 
one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival” and 
is protected by the Due Process Clause (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 
(1942)). 
170 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301–02 (1993); 
Palko, 302 U.S. at 325. In the Court’s 1993 decision in Reno v. Flores, Justice Antonin Scalia 
articulated the strict scrutiny standard that applies to fundamental rights under the Due 
Process Clause by stating that the Due Process Clause “forbids the government to infringe 
certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the 
infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” 507 U.S. at 301–02 
(citing Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 
U.S. 739, 746 (1987); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986)). 
171 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973) (utilizing the Due Process Clause 
to uphold a woman’s right to an abortion, despite contrary popular sentiment); Loving, 
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1967, during the peak of the civil rights movement, the Supreme Court 
relied on the Due Process Clause to invalidate miscegenation laws in 
Loving v. Virginia.172 In 1973, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court relied 
on the Due Process Clause to uphold a woman’s right to an abortion—
despite considerable public opinion to the contrary.173 As such, despite 
historians’ fears that judicial safeguarding of substantive rights would 
be too susceptible to public opinion and suffer without the proper pro-
tection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process Clause 
has effectively accomplished the goals of the Comity Clause and re-
peatedly withstood contrary popular opinion.174 
B. The Ratification Debates Approach 
 Legal historians focusing on the ratification debates as evidence of 
the intended meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause believe 
that the Clause was ratified to incorporate the first eight amendments 
of the U.S. Constitution against state action.175 These legal historians 
primarily focus on the speeches of the chief drafters of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, among them Representative Bingham and Senator How-
ard, in which they presented incorporation as the intended purpose for 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause.176 As the speeches of Bingham, 
Howard, and others were widely distributed, these legal historians be-
lieve that incorporation was not only what the drafters’ intended, but 
also what the public expected.177 
 Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, none of the 
constitutional amendments had been incorporated against the states.178 
This meant that the Constitution’s first eight amendments only applied 
                                                                                                                      
388 U.S. at 12–13 (utilizing the Due Process Clause to establish a fundamental right of 
marriage, thereby invalidating anti-miscegenation laws); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 485–86 (1965) (finding that a Connecticut law banning sales of contraceptives to 
unmarried couples violated a person’s fundamental right and inhibited marital privacy). 
172 388 U.S. at 12–13. 
173 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
174 See id.; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485–86; Hamburger, supra note 
28, at 133–34. 
175 See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
178 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908). It was not until 1908, in Twining v. 
New Jersey, that the Supreme Court first contemplated the possibility of incorporation. 211 
U.S. at 99. 
2013] Sunk Cost Principles and the Privileges or Immunities Clause 1829 
to federal action, rather than state action.179 For example, the federal 
government was prohibited from infringing a person’s freedom of 
speech; from conducting a warrantless search; and from inflicting cruel 
and unusual punishment; whereas the states had free reign under the 
Constitution to do so.180 Accordingly, the proponents of this reading of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause believed that the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment meant that the Constitution would serve to 
limit not only federal action, but state action, as well.181 
 Although such an interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause would have incorporated the entirety of the Bill of Rights in one 
swift maneuver, in the decades since Slaughter-House, the Supreme 
Court has incorporated a majority of the Bill of Rights against state ac-
tion through a selective incorporation process.182 The process of incor-
poration began in 1908, in Twining v. New Jersey, in which the Supreme 
Court recognized the possibility that some of the Constitution’s first 
eight amendments could be incorporated against state action because 
to not do so would violate a person’s Due Process rights.183 The Court 
                                                                                                                      
179 See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; id. amend. VII; id. amend. VI; id. amend. V; id. 
amend. IV; id. amend. III; id. amend. II; id. amend. I; supra note 178 and accompanying 
text. 
180 See U.S. Const. amend. VIII (cruel and unusual punishment); id. amend. IV (un-
reasonable search and seizure); id. amend. I (freedom of speech); supra note 178 and ac-
companying text. This is no longer the case; the Supreme Court has incorporated the First 
Amendment’s freedom of speech protection, the Fourth Amendment’s protection from 
unreasonable search and seizure, and the Eighth Amendment’s protection from cruel and 
unusual punishment against state action. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67 
(1962) (holding that the Eighth Amendment’s protection from cruel and unusual pun-
ishment is incorporated against state action); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27–28 (1949), 
overruled on other grounds by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection from unreasonable search and seizure is incorporated against 
state action); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (holding that the First Amend-
ment’s protection for the freedom of speech is incorporated against state action). 
181 See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
182 See infra notes 185–188 and accompanying text. 
183 211 U.S. at 99. In Twining, Justice William Moody explained the incorporation justi-
fication: 
[I]t is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight 
Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded against state 
action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of law. . . . 
If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight 
Amendments, but because they are of such a nature that they are included in 
the conception of due process of law. 
Id. 
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has continued to justify incorporation of a majority of the Bill of Rights 
with the same reasoning.184 
 Thus far, the Supreme Court has incorporated the First,185 Sec-
ond,186 Fourth,187 and Sixth188 Amendments in their entirety. Although 
the Supreme Court has never heard a case on the Third Amendment’s 
incorporation, the Second Circuit has held that it is incorporated in its 
entirety.189 Furthermore, a majority of the Fifth190 and Eighth191 
amendments have also been incorporated. The Supreme Court has 
only expressly declined to incorporate two provisions of the Bill of 
Rights: the Fifth Amendment’s right to a grand jury indictment in crim-
                                                                                                                      
184 See infra notes 185–188 and accompanying text. 
185 See U.S. Const. amend. I; Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles 
and Policies 503 (3d ed. 2006). See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
(incorporating the establishment clause); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) 
(incorporating the free exercise clause); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (incorporat-
ing the right to petition); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (incorporating the 
freedom of assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (incorporating the freedom 
of the press); Gitlow, 268 U.S. 652 (incorporating the freedom of speech). 
186 See U.S. Const. amend. II; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 
(2010) (plurality opinion) (incorporating the entirety of the Second Amendment). 
187 See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Chemerinsky, supra note 185, at 503. See generally Wolf, 
338 U.S. 25 (incorporating the protection against search and seizures and the requirement 
for a warrant based on probable cause). 
188 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Chemerinsky, supra note 185, at 504. See generally Wash-
ington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (incorporating the right to obtain favorable witnesses); 
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (incorporating the right to a speedy trial); 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (incorporating the right to confront adverse wit-
nesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1965) (incorporating the right to have assis-
tance of counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (incorporating the right to an impar-
tial jury); In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (incorporating the right to a public trial and 
the right to notice of charges). 
189 See U.S. Const. amend. III (proscribing the quartering of soldiers); Chemerinsky, 
supra note 185, at 505; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.13 (plurality opinion) (“We 
never have decided whether the Third Amendment . . . applies to the States through the 
Due Process Clause”). See generally Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding 
that the Third Amendment applies to both federal and state action). 
190 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Chemerinsky, supra note 185, at 504. See generally Benton, 
395 U.S. 784 (incorporating double jeopardy); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (incor-
porating the protection against self-incrimination); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. 
Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (incorporating the requirement that the gov-
ernment pay just compensation for taking property). 
191 See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Chemerinsky, supra note 185, at 504. See generally 
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971) (incorporating the prohibition against excessive 
bail); Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (incorporating the prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment). The Court has never determined whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibi-
tion on “excessive fines” is incorporated against the states. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 
n.13 (plurality opinion) (“We never have decided whether . . . the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of excessive fines applies to the States through the Due Process Clause.”). 
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inal cases192 and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial in civil 
cases.193 
 The development of the incorporation doctrine since Twining in-
dicates that overturning Slaughter-House today would have a much 
smaller impact than the followers of the ratification-debates approach 
would have foreseen.194 Reviving the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
under this historical interpretation, would serve as a catalyst to total 
incorporation of the remaining unincorporated provisions of the Bill of 
Rights.195 Accordingly, such a decision would only affect portions of the 
Fifth and Seventh Amendments, the only two provisions of the Bill of 
Rights that the Supreme Court has expressly refused to incorporate in 
the years since Slaughter-House.196 
C. The Federalism Approach 
 The legal historians who view the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
as a product of the ideological debate over federalism see the clause as 
indoctrinating the preeminence of the national government over the 
state governments.197 Accordingly, these historians believe the Four-
teenth Amendment was drafted both to fully incorporate the Bill of 
Rights against state infringement and to constitutionalize the preemi-
nence of national citizenship over state citizenship.198 
                                                                                                                      
192 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (noting that the Court was “unable 
to say that the substitution for a presentment or indictment by a grand jury . . . is not due 
process of law”). 
193 Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 219 (1916) (holding 
that the right to a jury trial in civil actions did not apply to state action where there is “no 
ground for the proposition that the Amendment is applicable and controlling in proceed-
ings in state courts deriving their authority from state law”). 
194 Compare McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3073–74 (Thomas, J., concurring) (subscribing to 
the belief that the Privileges or Immunities Clause incorporates the first eight amend-
ments of the Constitution), Butchers’ Benevolent Assoc. of New Orleans v. Crescent City 
Live-Stock Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 118–20 (1872) [herein-
after Slaughter-House] (Bradley, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority opinion evis-
cerated the efficacy of the Privileges or Immunities Clause), and id. at 96–97 (Field, J., 
dissenting) (same), with supra notes 175–196 and accompanying text (illustrating how the 
majority of the Bill of Rights has already been incorporated against the states). 
195 See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3073–74 (Thomas, J., concurring); Petitioner Brief, supra 
note 49, at 15–16; Goldwater Brief, supra note 49, at 21; Corrigan, supra note 51, at 436–37. 
196 See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co., 241 U.S. at 219 (Seventh Amendment); Hu-
tardo, 110 U.S. at 538 (Fifth Amendment); supra notes 185–191 and accompanying text 
(illustrating how the remaining Bill of Rights amendments have been largely incorpo-
rated). 
197 See supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. 
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 Given the polarizing nature of the Antebellum Period, it is not 
surprising that the drafters may have intended to constitutionalize an 
understanding of federalism that mandated for a stronger federal pow-
er and subordinate state powers.199 The relative power of states has 
been a heated issue since the Constitutional Convention of 1787.200 It 
was not until a century later, however, that Americans would realize the 
real dangers of allowing states to accrue too much power.201 In the An-
tebellum Period, the southern states began to disagree with the north-
ern states on fundamental questions of slavery and citizenship.202 As 
the schism continued to splinter the North and South, the federal gov-
ernment was nearly powerless to resolve it.203 The legal historians sub-
scribing to a federalism-driven interpretation believe that the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause was intended to reinvigorate the national gov-
ernment so that it could suppress any future resurgence of state power 
prior to the point of secession.204 
                                                                                                                     
 Although tempering state power was a major concern in the Re-
construction Era, in the years since Slaughter-House, even in the absence 
of a constitutional mandate to that effect, the federal government has 
asserted itself as dominant over state governments.205 No example is 
more revealing than the desegregation saga of the 1950s.206 In 1954 in 
Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that segregated 
 
199 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10–11; Rich, supra note 69, at 1126–27; Shankman 
& Pilon, supra note 79, at 24–25. 
200 See Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional Con-
vention of 1787 as a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 80 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 1707, 1717–23 (2011) (describing debates at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 
regarding the power among states; the power between the federal government and state 
governments; and the power between Congress and the President). 
201 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10–11; Shankman & Pilon, supra note 79, at 34 (not-
ing the realized dangers associated with state power following the Civil War and stating 
that “[t]he Civil War generation meant to rewrite, in this limited way, the relationship be-
tween the federal government and the states”). 
202 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 405–07 (1856) (finding one’s state citizenship did not natu-
rally confer national citizenship); Hamburger, supra note 28, at 88–89 (describing the de-
bate on state and federal citizenship during the Antebellum period). 
203 See Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 10–11; Rich, supra note 69, at 1126–27; Shankman 
& Pilon, supra note 79, at 24–25. 
204 Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 5–6; Rich, supra note 69, at 1126–27. 
205 See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (holding that Arkansas was required 
to follow the Supreme Court’s ruling in Brown); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495–96 
(1954) (holding segregated schools unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause); 
Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137–38 (1922) (holding that the Nineteenth Amendment 
applied to both federal and state elections, regardless of a particular state’s constitutional 
limitation on election qualifications). 
206 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96. 
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schools were per se unconstitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clause.207 Following a subsequent court order mandating desegrega-
tion of the Little Rock, Arkansas school district, Arkansas Governor Or-
val Faubus refused to comply.208 Governor Faubus went so far as to call 
the Arkansas National Guard to prevent the African-American school 
children from entering their newly desegregated school.209 In response, 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower federalized the Arkansas National 
Guard such that they could no longer take orders from Governor Fau-
bus and, further, deployed federal troops to escort the African-
American school children into the desegregated schools.210 As the Lit-
tle Rock school children continued to attend school, without interfer-
ence from the disgruntled state government, it was abundantly clear 
that the federal government had preeminent power over the Arkansas 
state government.211 
 The 140 years since Slaughter-House is replete with examples, both 
subtle and palpable, of the dominance of the federal government over 
state governments.212 Although the Civil War might have convinced 
some that the only way to temper state power was through a constitu-
tional mandate to that effect, the federal government has been able to 
establish its modern-day predominance without one.213 
                                                                                                                      
207 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96. 
208 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4. 
209 Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance, and the Im-
age of American Democracy, 70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1641, 1659–60 (1997). 
210 Id. at 1662. The power of the federal government was further emphasized in the 
Supreme Court’s 1958 decision in Cooper v. Aaron. See 358 U.S. at 18. During the 1950s, the 
Little Rock school board sought suspension of the desegregation order from Brown by 
citing the recent enactment of an Arkansas state law that blocked desegregation. Id. at 7–8. 
The unanimous Court, in a decision signed by each member, held that the Court’s deci-
sion would always be binding on all states, regardless of any state law to the contrary. Id. at 
18. 
211 See Cooper, 358 U.S. at 18; Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96. 
212 See, e.g., Leser, 258 U.S. at 137–38 (holding that the Nineteenth Amendment, grant-
ing universal suffrage to women, applied to both federal and state elections, regardless of a 
state’s constitutional limitation on suffrage by sex); supra notes 206–211 and accompany-
ing text (providing further examples of how the federal government has asserted itself 
over state governments). 
213 Compare supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text (detailing legal historians’ ar-
guments that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was intended to constitutionalize the 
theory of paramount national citizenship), with supra notes 206–212 and accompanying 
text (describing the modern growth in federal power). 
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IV. Sunk Costs: Why the Supreme Court’s Adherence to “Sunk 
Cost” Principles is a Rational Resolution to the  
Long-Debated Issues of Slaughter-House and  
the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
 The Privileges or Immunities Clause may always be considered a 
quirk of American Constitutional Law.214 Case in point: if recent Su-
preme Court decisions are any indication, the Court is unlikely to ap-
pease legal historians if they continue to encourage the Court to dis-
avow Slaughter-House.215 
 In deciding to continue to uphold Slaughter-House, the Supreme 
Court should, and may already, view the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause under “sunk cost” principles.216 Under these principles, the 
Court should recognize the 140 years that American jurisprudence has 
invested in the Slaughter-House interpretation of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause.217 Furthermore, the Court should consider that few 
substantive rights would be recognized if Slaughter-House were over-
turned.218 Because of these factors, legal scholars should both accept 
that the Slaughter-House interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause is unlikely to change, but also embrace that the Court’s ad hoc 
approach in the years since Slaughter-House has nevertheless secured 
substantive rights through alternative legal avenues.219 
                                                                                                                      
214 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 61. 
215 See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (holding that the 
Second Amendment was incorporated against state action without “disturb[ing] the 
Slaughterhouse holding”); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (finding that the right to travel 
was protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause without altering the Court’s ruling in 
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A. The “Sunk Cost” Principles as Manifested in American Jurisprudence 
 “Sunk cost” principles are “manifested in a greater tendency to 
continue an endeavor once an investment in money, effort, or time has 
been made.”220 Relying on sunk costs, however, is irrational because 
one’s prior investment should not influence one’s consideration of fu-
ture options.221 Instead, the benefit of a future action, alone, should 
inform a decision, rather than a past investment—which, for better or 
for worse, cannot be changed.222 Despite the inherent irrationality in 
considering the sunk costs of a previous action, research suggests that 
people commonly commit this error as a result of a popular “don’t 
waste” mindset.223 Instead, the rational consideration to make before 
taking an action is to consider the “opportunity cost” of that action.224 
Opportunity costs are the profits sacrificed by rejecting to seek a par-
ticular path; simply put, they are the costs of “the road not taken.”225 
                                                                                                                      
220 Arkes & Blumer, supra note 216, at 124. Arkes and Blumer describe a common ex-
ample of a “sunk cost” situation: 
A man wins a contest sponsored by a local radio station. He is given a free ticket 
to a football game. Since he does not want to go alone, he persuades a friend to 
buy a ticket and go with him. As they prepare to go to the game, a terrible bliz-
zard begins. The contest winner peers out his window over the arctic scene and 
announces that he is not going, because the pain of enduring the snowstorm 
would be greater than the enjoyment he would derive from watching the game. 
However, his friend protests, “I don’t want to waste the twelve dollars I paid for 
the ticket! I want to go!” The friend who purchased the ticket is not behaving 
rationally according to traditional economic theory. Only incremental costs 
should influence decisions, not sunk costs. If the agony of sitting in a blinding 
snowstorm for three hours is greater than the enjoyment one would derive from 
trying to see the game, then one should not go. The $12 has been paid whether 
one goes or not. It is a sunk cost. It should in no way influence the decision to 
go. But who among us is so rational? 
Id. at 125. 
221 Kelly, supra note 216, at 61 (noting that “the conventional wisdom about sunk costs 
then, might be summarized as the conjunction of two claims: (1) individuals often do give 
weight to sunk costs in their decision-making, and (2) it is irrational for them to do so”); 
Roberto, supra note 216 (stating that “[t]he amount of any previous irreversible invest-
ment in [an] activity ought to not affect the decision that is being made. Prior investments, 
which cannot be recovered, represent sunk costs which should not be relevant”). 
222 Kelly, supra note 216, at 63–64; Roberto, supra note 216. 
223 Arkes & Ayton, supra note 216, at 565 (noting that relying on sunk costs is often 
predicated on one’s desire “not to appear to be wasteful”); Kelly, supra note 216, at 64 
(noting that “individuals often continue to pour resources into already-begun projects 
because they fear that, if they abandon a project in which they have already invested heav-
ily, they will be perceived as being wasteful by others”). 
224 Roberto, supra note 216. 
225 Id. (stating that “[b]y sticking to a previously chosen path, an organization naturally 
forsakes other possible uses for its physical, financial, and human resources”). 
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 Although the sunk cost doctrine is generally understood to de-
scribe economic or psychological happenings, it applies just as easily to 
the treatment of the Privileges or Immunities Clause in American Con-
stitutional jurisprudence.226 For example, the Supreme Court’s 2010 
decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago to not revive the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause highlighted a “don’t waste” mindset: the Court not-
ed that overturning Slaughter-House was not worth risking decades of 
precedential decisions.227 Although the Court’s current Privileges or 
Immunities Clause jurisprudence may mischaracterize the drafters’ in-
tentions, the decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that the Court 
believes overturning 140 years of case law in the name of historical pu-
rity would be “wasteful.”228 
B. Maintaining the Slaughter-House Decision Today:  
The Lack of Opportunity Cost 
 Although it is irrational to consider the sunk costs of an action 
prior to proceeding, the Supreme Court’s choice to stave off modern 
attempts to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause is nonetheless 
rational.229 This is because there are no real opportunity costs sacrificed 
if the Supreme Court continues to uphold Slaughter-House.230 If the Su-
preme Court had decided Slaughter-House differently in 1872, such a 
decision would have massively expanded Americans’ substantive rights 
at that time.231 In contrast, if the decision to revive the Privileges or 
                                                                                                                      
226 See Arkes & Ayton, supra note 216, at 598–99; Arkes & Blumer, supra note 216, at 
124; Kelly, supra note 216, at 63–64; Roberto, supra note 216. 
227 See 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 (plurality opinion) (noting that the Supreme Court had 
capably analyzed fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause for the 140 years since 
Slaughter-House, and for that reason, “declin[ing] to disturb the Slaughterhouse holding”); 
McDonald Transcript, supra note 8, at 7. During oral argument in McDonald, Justice Scalia 
addressed the petitioner’s Privileges or Immunities Clause argument and asked: “Why do 
you want to undertake that burden instead of just arguing substantive due process? Which, 
as much as I think it’s wrong, I have—even I have acquiesced in it.” Id. at 7. 
228 See Arkes & Blumer, supra note 216, at 124. Compare supra notes 19–84 and accom-
panying text (describing three interpretations of the Antebellum and Reconstruction Eras 
that support a robust Privileges or Immunities Clause), with supra notes 85–148 and ac-
companying text (illustrating how the Supreme Court has relegated the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause to a position of relative insignificance and has expressed a disinclination 
to move from this position). 
229 See Arkes & Ayton, supra note 216, at 598–99; Kelly, supra note 216, at 65–66. 
230 See infra notes 156–213 and accompanying text. 
231 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 61. 
2013] Sunk Cost Principles and the Privileges or Immunities Clause 1837 
Immunities Clause were made today, the impact on those same rights 
would be quite underwhelming.232 
  In terms of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the cost of “the 
road not traveled” is relatively low.233 Whether one subscribes to an in-
terpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause based on the Com-
ity Clause,234 the ratification debates,235 or the theme of federalism,236 
the truth is that most of the advances that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause would have achieved in 1872 have been attained through alter-
native avenues in the subsequent decades.237 If the Supreme Court de-
cided to revive the Privileges or Immunities Clause under a Comity 
Clause-based interpretation, the Privileges or Immunities Clause would 
provide very little beyond what has already been achieved through sub-
stantive Due Process standards.238 Alternatively, if the Supreme Court 
relied on the ratification debates to restore the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, the clause would only serve to incorporate the remaining two 
provisions of the Bill of Rights that have not yet been incorporated 
through the selective incorporation process.239 Lastly, if the Supreme 
Court referred to the growing sense of federalism as a guide to inter-
pret the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the clause would add very lit-
tle to the federal government’s dominance over the states, which has 
been significantly established through organic growth.240 Because most 
of the rights that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have pro-
tected at the time of Slaughter-House have been secured through alter-
                                                                                                                      
232 See supra notes 156–213 and accompanying text (describing how the intended ef-
fects of the Privileges or Immunities Clause have been achieved through alternative legal 
avenues since Slaughter-House). 
233 See supra notes 156–213 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 26–48 and accompanying text. 
235 See supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text. 
236 See supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text. 
237 See supra notes 156–213 and accompanying text (illustrating how the gains that are 
sought after based on each of these approaches have been largely achieved through alter-
native avenues in the years following Slaughter-House). 
238 Compare supra notes 26–48 and accompanying text (describing the Comity Clause 
approach), with supra notes 156–174 and accompanying text (describing how this ap-
proach’s sought-after gains have been largely achieved through alternative means). 
239 Compare supra notes 49–68 and accompanying text (describing the ratification de-
bates approach), with supra notes 175–196 and accompanying text (describing how this 
approach’s sought-after gains have been largely achieved through alternative means). 
240 Compare supra notes 69–84 and accompanying text (describing the federalism ap-
proach), with supra notes 197–213 and accompanying text (describing how this approach’s 
sought-after gains have been largely achieved through alternative means). 
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native means in the subsequent decades, there are no real opportunity 
costs that necessitate that the Supreme Court change course today.241 
C. Was the Wrong Way the Right Way All Along? 
 Given the lack of opportunity costs in maintaining the current 
course of Privileges or Immunities Clause jurisprudence, it is clear that 
the Supreme Court was rational in refusing the modern attempts to 
revive the Clause.242 In addition, the argument could be made that Jus-
tice Miller’s decision to shelve the Privileges or Immunities Clause in 
Slaughter-House may have been the most rational decision the Supreme 
Court could have made at that time.243 This is the case because even if a 
majority of the Court at the time believed that the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause should have extended substantive rights, there may have 
been real dangers in doing so.244 In the Reconstruction Era, the Ameri-
can people may not have been ready for the sudden wealth of substan-
tive rights that the Privileges or Immunities Clause would have pro-
vided.245 The country had just weathered the most divisive event in its 
history—and such wounds do not heal overnight.246 If the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause had been interpreted as its drafters intended it, the 
drastic change in the legal landscape may have occurred too soon—
which might have threatened the fragile, newly formed Union.247 Even 
if the justices felt that the Privileges or Immunities Clause should have 
expanded substantive rights, they might have also realized that issuing a 
decision reaching this conclusion would have come at a potentially 
steep price.248 The costs of extending these rights simply might not 
have been worth the benefits.249 
                                                                                                                      
241 See supra notes 233–240 and accompanying text. 
242 See Roberto, supra note 216; supra notes 229–241 and accompanying text. 
243 See Butchers’ Benevolent Assoc. of New Orleans v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing 
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Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
245 See Hamburger, supra note 28, at 77–79. 
246 See id. at 77. 
247 See Bogen, supra note 243, at 393–94. 
248 See id. 
249 See id. 
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 In a similar way, the Court’s ad hoc approach in the years after 
Slaughter-House suggests that the Court recognized additional substan-
tive rights only when it thought it was rational to do so.250 Rather than 
instantaneously recognizing a whole slew of substantive rights—a po-
tentially risky move—the Court predominantly recognized rights in a 
timely way that was in line with public opinion, instead of acting too far 
ahead of it.251 Instead of incorporating the entirety of the Bill of Rights 
in 1872, the Court has incorporated a majority of the Bill of Rights 
slowly through the selective incorporation process.252 And, rather than 
establish a formal hierarchy of federal citizenship as supreme over state 
citizenship, this supremacy has been accomplished organically through 
the decades through other means.253 As such, the drafters’ goal in en-
acting the Privileges or Immunities Clause, whatever it truly was, has 
been inevitably realized in the 140 years after its adoption—albeit in a 
very nuanced and rational way.254 
Conclusion 
 Although legal historians may never stop pushing to overturn 
Slaughter-House, they should reflect on what their goals are for doing so. 
If the goal is to usher in monumental additions to our substantive 
rights, they may be out of luck, as much of what the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause would have achieved in 1872 has since been realized in 
the subsequent decades. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the Supreme 
Court will ever overturn Slaughter-House. Instead, the Supreme Court 
has likely subscribed to sunk cost principles. Specifically, the Court has 
expressed its resistance to overturn Slaughter-House due to the long-
established alternative legal avenues that have largely achieved the in-
tended goals of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Legal scholars 
should recognize that the Supreme Court’s dependence on these prin-
ciples, although typically irrational, is in fact rational under these cir-
cumstances. This is particularly true in the case of Slaughter-House be-
                                                                                                                      
250 See supra notes 168–174 and accompanying text (explaining the way in which the 
Supreme Court has employed the Due Process Clause to protect certain fundamental 
rights); supra notes 182–196 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s use 
of a selective incorporation process that has incorporated nearly all of the Bill of Rights 
against state action); supra notes 205–213 and accompanying text (detailing the Supreme 
Court’s role in ensuring that federal power trumped state power at pivotal moments in the 
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254 See supra notes 156–213 and accompanying text. 
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cause the opportunity costs in maintaining the current Privileges or 
Immunities Clause jurisprudence are relatively low. For the most part, 
the potential purposes of the clause have been otherwise achieved. 
Perhaps, instead, legal scholars who advocate for a revival of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause should ask themselves whether their advo-
cacy for the clause is entirely rational. 
Emily Jennings 
